A TROUBLED CARTEL: THE NCAA
JAmrs V. KocH*

Despite the claims of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) that
it is a champion of amateur athletics and physical fitness in colleges and universities,
the NCAA is in fact a business cartel composed of university-firms which have varying desires to restrict competition and maximize profits in the area of intercollegiate
athletics. The aims and activities of the university-firms in the NCAA are extremely diverse, and therein lies the most important cause of both the long-term
and the contemporary problems which have confronted the NCAA. This diversity
also explains the recent move of the Association to establish a three-division structure in which the schools operating major intercollegiate athletic programs are
grouped in Division I and the remaining schools-perhaps two-thirds of the NCAA
members-are organized in Divisions II and III. The recent spate of court actions
and legal maneuvers by certain individual university-firms in the NCAA against
the NCAA itself is further visible evidence of both the unsatisfactory operation of
the cartel in the view of some and the heterogeneity of membership in the NCAA.
Economic theory in the area of cartelization has proven to be a remarkably accurate
predictor of the stresses and strains which have beset the NCAA. That same theory
also offers some insights into the recent move to a three-division structure.
I
TnE NCAA AS A CARTEL
The NCAA is easily the most powerful and the most prestigious organization
regulating intercollegiate athletic competition in the United States today. 2 Over
66o colleges and universities are members of the NCAA, and the NCAA will soon
be conducting over forty national championships in over twenty sports in addition
to the rule-making, record-keeping, and enforcement functions which characterize
any cartel.
The rules and regulations of the NCAA are specified in its Constitution, Bylaws,
Official Interpretations of the Bylaws, Executive Regulations, Recommended Policies
and Practices, and Procedures Concerning Enforcement While changes in each
* Professor of Economics, Illinois State University.
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See N.Y. Tnes, Aug. 7, 1973, at 41, col. 6.
A rival organization operating in the intercollegiate athletic arena is the National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA). Few, if any, university-firms which operate big-time intercollegiate
athletic programs are members of the NAIA, however. NAIA members are typically small colleges operating intercollegiate athletic programs which are relatively inexpensive and which are not primarily based
upon recruitment and payment of athletes for their services.

The collected rules and regulations may be found in

1972-73 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE

ATHLETIc AssoCIATIoD (1973) [hereinafter cited as NCAA MANUAL]. For a more detailed discussion
of the internal structure of the NCAA, see Koch, The Economics of "Big-Time" Intercollegiate Athletics,
52 SocIAL Se. Q. 248 (1971).
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division's rules and regulations must be ratified by the university-firms assembled
in annual convention, the day-to-day governance of the NCAA is carried out by
the NCAA Council. The NCAA Council was recently reorganized to give eight
representatives to the larger members in Division I, and four each from the smaller
Divisions II and III. Prior to this new system of representation, both the Council
and the NCAA's myriad of committees had tended to be dominated by universityfirms which operate big-time intercollegiate athletic programs predicated upon extensive scholarship aid to their athletes. This did not go unnoticed and was a constant sorepoint with those university-firms with programs operated on a smaller
scale. For example, the Eastern Collegiate Athletic Association (ECAC), a looselyknit group of over 2oo NCAA members located in the northeastern part of the
United States, had argued strenuously that its members were vastly underepresented
on the NCAA Council and committees.4 Most ECAC members either do not
operate big-time programs or operate such programs in only one sport. This conflict of interests resulted in the ECAC threatening to bring suit against the NCAA
in order to correct the alleged imbalance in representation. It remains to be seen
if the recent reorganization can relieve this strain.
It is not apparent to some (and particularly to the NCAA itself) that the Association is a cartel which restricts competition in order to further the ends of its
members. The NCAA states officially that it is interested only in the "amateur
student-athlete . ."' who engages in intercollegiate athletics "for the physical,
mental, social and edicational benefits he derives therefrom and to whom athletics
is an avocation."'6 The NCAA proclaims that its goals are the promotion of "educational leadership, physical fitness, sports participation . . . ."7 Nowhere are
goals of profit maximization, cost minimization, or restriction of competition mentioned. However, as we shall see, the actions of the NCAA clearly stamp it as a
moderately successful business cartel whose success has been limited primarily by
the heterogeneity of its membership. United States Senator Marlow W. Cook, of
Kentucky, incisively cut through the maze of slogans and jargon that the NCAA
has erected when he stated that "[t]he NCAA is a body primarily designed to
protect and defend its member institutions from the professional sports world and
to make sure that collegiate sports gets its share of the sports business pie."
A cartel has been defined as an organization of firms which makes agreements
concerning such matters as prices, outputs, market areas, the use and construction
of productive capacity, and advertising expenditures.' The NCAA does all of
these in the area of intercollegiate athletics in that it: (a) sets the maximum price
that can be paid for intercollegiate athletes; (b) regulates the quantity of athletes
'N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 7, x973, § 5, at 2, col. 4.
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that can be purchased in a given time period; (c) regulates the duration and intensity of usage of those athletes; (d) occasionally fixes the price at which sports
outputs can be sold (for example, the setting of ticket prices at NCAA championship events which are held on the campuses of cartel members); (e) periodically
informs cartel members about transactions, costs, market conditions, and sales techniques;"0 (f) occasionally pools and distributes portions of the cartel's profits, particularly those which result from intercollegiate football and basketball; and (g)
polices the behavior of the members of the cartel and levies penalties against those
members who are deemed to be in violation of cartel rules and regulations.
If the university-firms which are members of the NCAA can be viewed as firms
buying inputs and producing outputs,-" then it is apparent that by far the most
detailed restrictions are imposed upon the activities of the firms on the input side
of the market. While many different inputs are utilized to produce the output
known as intercollegiate sports, the two inputs which are of most interest are the
other teams, that is, the competition, and the "student-athletes"" purchased by the
university-firms.
Competition is an indispensable input to the success of intercollegiate athletics
and, when such ingredient is absent, spectators lose interest in the game in question.
Only a masochist would have substantial interest in football games between the
University of Nebraska and the club team of the University of Chicago. However,
a game between the Universities of Nebraska and Oklahoma is a contest and is
therefore of great interest to paying spectators. The relevant point here is, of course,
that it is in the best interests of the NCAA and its component members to strive by
rule, fiat, and enforcement to make competition reasonably equal among members
that choose to compete with each other. Cartel limitations upon the number of
athletic scholarships that can be granted by a university-firm, the establishment of
Division I composed predominantly of universities supporting big-time programs
and Divisions II and III composed of universities which maintain more modest
goals and expectations, and the division of profits from NCAA activities among
members are examples of the NCAA's continual attempt to make the athletic
competition among its members strenuous and competitively equal in the sense of
the outcome not being predetermined. Tight athletic contests and conference races
10 A major vehicle for such information-spreading is the NCAA News, a newspaper which is published by the NCAA and sent to its members. Another example is a detailed and specialized cost and
revenues study which is distributed to members, NCAA, AN ANALYSIS OF REVENUES, EXPENSES, AND MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTI E oF INTERCOLLEGiATE AnMErsc PROG AMS (1970). This writer knows
of no other cartel which provides such mountains of detail on each member's operations to the other
members of the cartel.
" The outputs of non-collegiate sports have been examined in detail. See Davenport, Collusive
competition in Major League Baseball, 13 Am. ECON. 6 (Fall, 1969); Jones, The Economics of the National
Hockey League, 2 CAN. J. ECON. I (1969); Neale, The PeculiarEconomics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J.
EcoN. , (,964); Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242 (x956.) The outputs of collegiate sports have been examined by Koch, supra note 3.
"This term, frequently a euphemism, is the favored label of the NCAA for the athletes who compete for its member institutions.
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fill stadiums. In this regard, athletic conferences such as the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Pacific Eight, or even the obscure Prairie Conference are usefully viewed
as subcartels of similar university-firms designed to produce competitive athletic
events by grouping together university-firms of similar interests and attitudes. It
is ordinarily in the best interests of the NCAA to promote and assist the development of athletic conferences composed of university-firms supporting similar intercollegiate athletic programs.13
The most detailed and interesting rules imposed by the cartel occur in the area
of student-athletes. NCAA rules limit the number of student-athletes that a given
university-firm can purchase, how long these student-athletes may be used, and the
prices that rhay be paid for them. Furthermore, the NCAA has imposed stringent
rules limiting the manner in which competing university-firms may bid for the
newest crop of prospective student-athletes. Such rules limit the number of visits
which a student-athlete may make to a given campus, the amount of his expenses
that may be covered by the university-firm, and so forth. The intent, and sometimes also the effect, of such rules is to reduce recruiting and operating costs by
restraining competition.
II
THE CARTL'S STRUCTURE AS A SOURCE OF TROUBLE

The most successful business cartels pool and divide profits among the cartel
members. Less successful cartels are often limited to dividing prospective sales
among members, designating market territories, and reducing costs of competition
in whatever manner possible. The curse which ends the existence of most cartels
is the practice of chiseling: if one firm can secretly lower prices, steal sales, or evade
the rules of the cartel, then the cartel is likely to be ineffective and dissolve.
Successful cartels attain their success by forcing cartel members to obey cartel
rules and by making it impossible for new firms to join the cartel except at high
cost. The market structure of the cartel is a prime determinant of the cartel's
ability to force its members to conform and its ability to keep unwanted members
out.
A number of facets of market structure are critically important to a cartel's
operation.
(i) Number of Firms. Successful cartels seldom have a large number of member
firms. When the number of cartel members is small, the behavior of cartel members can more easily be policed. Therein lies a portion of the NCAA's troubles.
The NCAA has well over 6oo members, and the activities of all of these members are
virtually impossible to monitor effectively. While the success of the monitoring
effort may increase under the three-division structure, the size of each division is
still such as to limit cartel control.
"3 of course, by encouraging the development of conference affiliations, the NCAA also increascs the
possibility that powerful challenges to its authority can be led by conferences. The recent ECAC challenge, mentioned above, is an example.
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(2) Number of Points of Initiative. Successful cartels are usually characterized
by few points of initiative in the markets the cartel faces. That is, the number of
points where competition, purchasing, and selling can take place is limited. A
limited number of points of initiative means that it is much easier for the cartel to
observe the behavior of its members. Once again, the NCAA falls short here, for
the number of points of initiative is almost limitless. A large number of studentathletes exists, to say nothing of the large number of alumni and friends of university-firms that might violate rules. Furthermore, there is no need for the
university-firm that wishes to cheat to do so on the university campus. Hence,
transactions can take place nearly any place, at any time, and among sometimes
unknown individuals.
(3) Transactions Publicized Internally. If all transactions made by cartel members are immediately publicized to the remainder of the cartel members, then it is
unlikely that effective chiseling can take place. The NCAA, of course, attempts to
publicize internal transactions such as the signing of a student-athlete, the payment
of a fine, and so forth. Nonetheless, the NCAA is clearly incapable of reporting
all transactions because of the large number of points of initiative in the market.
Transactions by NCAA members simply are not reported immediately and openly
to NCAA members in the fashion of the New York Stock Exchange. This makes
chiseling easier and heightens the probability of ineffectiveness on the part of the
NCAA.
(4) Transactions Secret Externally. A successful cartel ordinarily wishes its
own members to be fully informed of transactions by its members, but at the same
time wishes to hide its members' actions from outsiders. The cartel does not function effectively when its laundry is in public view. Public reporting of transactions,
fines, and profits tends to attract interest, possible competition, and even governmental regulation. The NCAA is clearly deficient as a cartel in this respect. Its
actions are reported far and wide in the press and those who dislike its rules and
regulations have increasingly been seeking relief in the courts. Legislative investigative panels delve into the NCAA's affairs. Consequently, it is almost impossible
for the NCAA to maximize profits and minimize costs blatantly or for the NCAA
to chastise severely those who break its rules, because the NCAA is almost regarded
as the public domain.
(5) Existence of Barriers to Entry. The most successful cartels typically are
beneficiaries of substantial barriers to the entry of new firms into the markets where
the cartel members operate. That is, it is usually the case with successful cartels
that newly entering firms would suffer some cost disadvantage which does not
accrue to the firms already in the cartel. The NCAA also falls short here. It is
indeed difcult for the NCAA to refuse membership to any university-firm that
states that it will abide by the rules of the cartel. The public domain status of the
NCAA makes it nearly impossible for the NCAA arbitrarily to state that a school will
not be allowed to join the Association. Not only would such an action violate the
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slogans of the NCAA concerning the promotion of amateur athletics, but the action
also would probably result in legislation or legal action which would force the
NCAA's hand. Hence, nearly every university-firm can join the NCAA, and over
6oo have.
(6) Similarity of Member Interests and Costs. Cartels which contain members
who have greatly dissimilar interests and costs generally are not effective because
any rule which fits one type of member is often obnoxious to other members. Until
recently the NCAA clearly was subject to this failing. University-firms, such as
UCLA, which operate gigantic multi-million dollar athletic programs have little
or nothing in common with university-firms such as Messiah College, which purchase no student-athletes and often charge no admission to athletic events. Consequently, a rule or regulation which was advocated by UCLA often would have been
objected to by Messiah College. When dissimilar interests and costs structures characterize a cartel, that cartel either breaks up or becomes ineffective. The NCAA has
been largely characterized by ineffectiveness despite its domination by universityfirms operating big-time programs. This situation supplied the major impetus for
the recent reorganization of the NCAA into three divisions, which is intended to
lessen the extent of dissimilarity within each decision-making body.
(7)Purchasers Without Monopsony Power. A frequent characteristic of successful cartels is the fact that they sell their output to customers who are often
small in size and have little economic clout or monopsony power. Such is largely
the case with the NCAA. The single spectator to whom the NCAA sells its output
has little influence over ticket prices or even the number of games played. Reversing
the buyer-seller relationship for a moment, when the NCAA is the customer, it
once again usually deals with sellers who have relatively little monopoly power. A
single high school star may indeed be able to influence the price a university-firm
pays him, but that is not the general case. The majority of student-athletes are
purchased by university-firms in the NCAA for the standard "full ride" (tuition,
room, board, books, and $15 per month for "laundry money"). Of course, the
value of tuition, room, and board is not the same at all university-firms, and this
does introduce a permissible element of price competition into the market.
In sum, the characteristics of market structure that most often are associated with
successful cartels are frequently absent in the case of the NCAA. For a long time,
the NCAA found it almost impossible to reconcile the conflicts inherent within its
heterogeneous membership. As Darrell Royal, the well-known football coach of the
University of Texas, so aptly put it, "Texas doesn't want Hofstra telling it what
to do and vice-versa."' 4 The new divisional structure represents an attempt to
respond to Royal's concern. But even if Texas and Hofstra belong to different divisions under the recent reorganization, the prevailing market structure makes
it highly probable that considerable cheating would occur in any case and that the
NCAA would face many of its present problems.
"N.Y.

Times, Jan. 16, 1973, at 47, COl. I.
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III
REcENT LEGAL CHALLENGES AS A FUNCTION

OF HETEROGENEOUS MEMBERSHIP

The NCAA has in the very recent past been subjected to a spate of law suits
which allege that it has overstepped its powers. These suits typically seek to have
a court prevent the NCAA from enforcing one of its rules and from imposing penalties for noncompliance with such rules. Almost without exception, the suits are
filed by athletes who attend university-firms which operate big-time athletic programs, for it is these university-firms whose activities are most circumscribed by the
cartel as a whole. While the actions against the NCAA have been brought by individuals rather than the university-firms, the latter have been vocal in their support and encouragement of the plaintiffs.
5
An important example of such a suit is Curtis v. NCAA.j Isaac Curtis and
Larry Brumsey, athletes attending the University of California at Berkeley, were
ruled ineligible for intercollegiate athletic competition by the NCAA, because the
two athletes did not "predict" a 1.6o grade point average. One of the many rules
of the NCAA at the time was one which indicated that a student-athlete could not
be given financial aid and considered to be eligible for intercollegiate athletic competition unless his previous academic record indicated that he would be able to
achieve at least a i.6o grade point average on a 4.00 scale. The NCAA allowed its
members to use several different tables which incorporated variables such as high
school grade point average and standardized national test scores in order to arrive
at a determination of whether the student-athlete would predict at least a i.6o.
Berkeley was charged by the NCAA with administering special nonscheduled
national tests to Curtis and Brumsey in order to enable the two student-athletes to
predict the required x.6o. The unauthorized nature of the tests caused the NCAA
to declare officially that Curtis and Brumsey had not provided national test scores
sufficient to predict the needed i.6o.Y
As a result of the NCAA's declaration of ineligibility for Curtis and Brumsey,
the university appealed the NCAA's original ruling to the NCAA Council. That
appeal was denied and the Curtis-Brumsey law suit resulted. The suit was subsequently withdrawn, and Curtis transferred to California State University at
San Diego, where he was soon eligible because his academic record was sufficiently
strong to enable him to satisfy the NCAA's rules. The NCAA does allow a prospective student-athlete to demonstrate in the classroom that he is worthy of
eligibility, and Curtis thus became eligible by this route.
The so-called "predicted i.6o" grade point average rule was also the center of
1

No. C-71-2o88-ACNV (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 29, 1971).
"0 The NCAA acted in a similar fashion against student-athlete James McAlister of UCLA when 63
erasures were found on McAlister's national entrance test after McAlister had taken that test at a special
private administration handled by UCLA intercollegiate athletic authorities. The NCAA disallowed the
results of this examination and declared that McAlister was ineligible by virtue of not predicting the
required x.6o grade point average. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at 52, col. a.
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attention in a case involving Centenary College and the NCAA. Centenary College granted financial aid to five student-athletes and considered them eligible for
intercollegiate competition, despite the NCAA's judgment that they were ineligible
for failure to satisfy the predicted i.6o grade point average rule. As a result, the
NCAA sought to apply sanctions to the college and to the five student-athletes.
At the same time, the Association also offered to reduce substantially the penalty
imposed against the college if the school would agree that the five student-athletes
were ineligible. Centenary College was loath to do this because one of the studentathletes, Robert Parish, was a seven-foot basketball center who was apparently the
mainstay of the Centenary College team.
The five student-athletes brought suit against the NCAA, charging that they
were being subjected to rules and requirements which were not uniformly applied
to all students, athlete and non-athlete, alike 1r A temporary restraining order was
issued against the NCAA, prohibiting it from levying any penalties against the
student-athletes in question. That temporary order was later dissolved, and an
attempt by the student-athletes to obtain a permanent restraining order against the
NCAA was in the offing in April, 1973. Ironically, while these legal proceedings
were in progress, the NCAA membership itself voted to do away with the predicted i.6o rule and substitute for it a much more lenient standard for aid and
eligibility under which any of the five student-athletes in question would have been
eligible. Also, Parish, whose services had been widely sought by hundreds of
university-firms, applied to the National Basketball Association for "hardship status"
and was therefore likely to be drafted by a professional basketball team. Such a
development would further the argument that the case had become moot. The NCAA,
however, argued that it fully intended to prosecute Centenary College as if the x.6o
to do otherwise would be to invite rule-breakrule still existed on-the grounds that
8
ing in anticipation of rule changes.'
A third example of resort to the courts to enjoin NCAA enforcement of its
regulations resulted from the attempt of the Association to declare ineligible two
basketball players at New Mexico State University, Roland "Tree" Grant and John
Williamson. The NCAA charged publicly that the two athletes had received substantial monetary payments in excess of those permitted under NCAA rules. Grant
and Williamson not only denied the charges, but also filed a $2.5 million libel
suit against the NCAA for its public accusations.'" A temporary restraining order
was obtained by Grant and Williamson, barring the NCAA from acting against
them in this matter, and a permanent injunction was later issued which restrained
the NCAA from any punitive action against the two athletes. This permanent injunction was dissolved when the NCAA stipulated that it would make no attempt
to act against the two student-athletes during the 1972-73 competitive season. That is,
7
Parish v. NCAA, Civil No. 18733 (W.D. La., filed Feb. 15, x973).
"This opinion was expressed to the author by Mr. David Berst, a member of the NCAA's legal

office.
" Grant v. NCAA (C..

Phila. Cnty., filed 1973).
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the NCAA agreed to stay any actions which would have affected the eligibility of
Grant and Williamson during the time period when the two student-athletes wished
to exercise their eligibility.
A more complex case which has similarly resulted in a reversion to legal
processes external to the NCAA is the case involving the University of Southwestern Louisiana (USL). In early 1973, the NCAA charged USL with more than
i2o violations of NCAA rules, including direct payments to student-athletes. The
NCAA then sought to take disciplinary action against USL and the student-athletes
involved. The USL basketball team, however, was a national "powerhouse" at that
time and had strong reason to want any investigation and action concerning it to
be delayed until after the end of the 1972-73 basketball season. USL entertained
hopes of being invited to national post-season basketball tournaments such as the
one operated by the NCAA, and it was expected that the punishment imposed
on USL for the alleged violations would include a prohibition against USL entering post-season competition.
The above factors caused USL to react sharply to the NCAA's charges. The
school claimed that it was impossible for it to prepare an adequate defense to the
more than i2o charges unless substantial time were allowed it. USL also maintained
that the NCAA's investigation and charges in this area were politically motivated
and were aimed at USL by larger and more established university-firms that felt
threatened by USL's meteoric rise to prominence2 0 Furthermore, USL hinted that
the large number of black players on the USL basketball team had caused the school
to be the target of outraged segregationist sentiment in Louisiana and that such
parties were spreading unfounded rumors in an attempt to punish USL.
Vocal protests against NCAA actions are both commonplace and ineffective,
however, and have seldom deterred the NCAA from any action. USL therefore
sought judicial relief and obtained a restraining order which prevented the NCAA
from taking punitive action against USL or its student-athletes prior to August 15,
1973. The effect of this restraining order was not only to enable USL to participate
in post-season tournaments, but also to give USL an increased amount of time to
reply to the multitude of charges facing it.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana later overturned the restraining order against the NCAA. USL then carried its case to the Louisiana Supreme
Court in an attempt to forestall NCAA action, but its application for a writ of
review was subsequently denied.21 In the midst of these legal maneuvers, the
NCAA invited USL's basketball team to the NCAA's prestigious post-season tournament, and USL accepted that invitation and participated.
However, in this dispute the NCAA was to have the final say. On August 5,
"°While never clearly stated, the implication was that university-firms such as Louisiana State
University were not interested in the development of a new athletic power in Louisiana and, therefore,
were interested in the demise of USL.
" Board of Educ. v. NCAA, No. 53,909 (La. s5 th Dist. Ct., Jan. IX, r973), rev'd, 273 So. ",d 912
(La. App. 1973), wit denied (La. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1973).
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1973, the NCAA Council imposed upon USL the harshest sanctions ever meted out
to a member. Citing some 125 infractions, it banned the school from any participation in intercollegiate basketball for two years, and barred USL's other athletic
teams from participating in NCAA post-season championships and national television broadcasts for a similar period. In addition, it said that the school must
return all trophies and receipts obtained as a result of participation in NCAA
basketball tournaments for the past three seasons, and that all placings in such
tournaments must be vacated. Further, the Council recommended that USL be
expelled from the NCAA altogether (an extremely severe penalty). A vote is to
be taken on this recommendation in January, i974. Following closely on the
heels of this action, the Southland Conference (of which USL is a member) on
probation and stripped it of all
August 20, 1973, placed the school on indefinite
23
years
two
past
the
during
earned
honors
The legal actions discussed in this section reveal that the NCAA has usually
been unsuccessful in preventing individual university-firms from seeking external
legal redress and that the individual university-firm has usually been successful in
obtaining restraining orders and injunctions which have had the effect of delaying
punitive action by the NCAA against alleged violators of the cartel's rules. However, the failures of the NCAA have not been total since the legal actions of the
university-firms have only postponed rather than prevented NCAA enforcement
and action. The NCAA and its constituent conferences have won external legal
battles when they could demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that immediate,
irreparable harm and injury would result from its actions not being upheld. In
Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives,24 the decision

of the court was that the Big Ten Conference could temporarily suspend a studentathlete pending a hearing. Therefore, temporary suspension of Ronald Behagen, a
University of Minnesota basketball player who was involved in a fight during a
basketball game between the University of Minnesota and Ohio State University,
was upheld. At the same time, the court warned that neither the NCAA nor particular athletic conferences and university-firms can impair a student-athlete's right
to engage in intercollegiate athletic competition which might bring great rewards,
without first according the student-athlete minimum standards of due process.
All of the legal actions referred to in this section were promoted by individual
NCAA members against the NCAA or its constituent conferences, despite the fact
that membership in the NCAA is conditional on the individual university-firm's
prior agreement that it will heed the NCAA's rules, regulations, and procedures.
That is, the university-firms agreed in joining the NCAA that they would abide
by the NCAA's rules and enforcement procedures. The NCAA, however, has not
been responsive to the desires of certain university-firms, which therefore have open12Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1973, § E, at 6, col. 5.
23N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1973, at 34, col. 2.
24 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972).
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ly encouraged individual student-athletes, state boards of education, and others to
attempt to quash NCAA actions by use of the external judicial system.
The recent suits against the NCAA are far more costly to the NCAA than the
dollars spent in fighting them in the courts. The suits are properly interpreted as
a sign that many university-firms have found the NCAA incompatible with their
interests and unresponsive to their needs. It is primarily the university-firms operating big-time programs which have been most dissatisfied. The establishment of
the three-division structure is an attempt to respond to this dissatisfaction and
open rebellion. Without such accommodations, the NCAA itself would likely
rupture and possibly dissolve.
IV
INTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS BY THE

NCAA

It would be quite incorrect to imply that the NCAA has not made some attempts
to lessen the stresses which are evident within it. Over ioo new rules and amendments were proposed at the January, 1973, NCAA meetings. A major concession
was made to big-time university-firms in the form of the abolition of the predicted
1.6o grade point average rule. In its place was substituted what has been described
as a "2.00 grade point average" rule. However, the 2.oo rule limits financial aid
to athletes in their first year of college to those who have graduated from an
accredited high school with a minimum grade point average of 2.00, certified
officially by the high school. As Walter Byers, the Executive Secretary of the NCAA
stated, "[i]t is considerably easier to score a 2.00 in high school than to predict a I.6o
for your freshman year in college. 2 5 In point of fact, this change effectively opened
the doors to NCAA scholarship aid to nearly all high school graduates and also
eliminated a large source of contention between the NCAA and certain universityfirms. The same convention also reduced academic requirements for financial aid
to junior college students2
A major attempt has been made at recent NCAA conventions to pass legislation which would reduce the costs associated with recruiting and maintaining
student-athletes. For example, the 1972 NCAA Convention extended eligibility in
all sports to college freshmen. Prior to that time, first year college students were not
eligible for varsity competition in football and basketball. 2 7 The effect of this move
was to reduce the costs of running a big-time intercollegiate athletic program, par"5Quoted in

SPoRTS ILLUSrRATED,

Jan.

22, 1973, at 57-

" The rule change also altered the NCAA's rules such that immediate aid and eligibility could be
extended to: (i) a graduate of a junior college; (2) a junior college student who has achieved 48
semester hours of junior college credit with a grade point average of at least 1.6o; or (3) a junior college
student who has achieved 24 semester hours of credit with a grade point average of at least 2.5o.
" The NCAA's College Division, which is primarily composed of university-firms operating athletic
programs which do not emphasize financial aid to student-athletes, had taken this step previously. The
College Division university-firms were therefore able to recruit some athletes at the expense of the
schools operating big-time programs (the so-called University Division), because they were able to
promise the prospective student-athlete that he would not be forced to wait one year for varsity eligibility.
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ticularly in the sport of basketball, where a significant number of student-athletes
can step directly from high school play into collegiate competition. Fordham University basketball coach Hal Wissel indicated that he had notified his administration that he would need fewer "full ride" athletic scholarships as a result,
because he would now be able to utilize the talents of each scholarship recipient
for one extra year and would not have to recruit an entire freshman team each
year.2 s Further benefits might be realized if recruiting expenditures reflected the
reduced number of student-athletes that are needed when freshmen have eligibility?9 External observers who misunderstand the basic motivation of the NCAA
decried the action. The New York Times editorialized that freshman eligibility was
"merely the latest in a long string of surrenders to professionalism and commercialism in college sports.""° Such commentaries, however, have typically had
little effect upon the NCAA when financial savings have been involved.
The most important readjustment of the NCAA occurred at a special convention
of the Association on August 6, 1973. The member colleges and universities subdivided the NCAA into three divisions, each of which will legislate its own rules
of conduct relative to factors such as the number of scholarships, freshman eligibility, and the like. This proposal was successful even though an earlier proposal
involving separation into two divisions was defeated at the January, 1973, Convention. 8l
There are several reasons why the three-division plan was ultimately approved
despite earlier opposition. First, the plan allows each university-firm to select
freely the division in which it wishes to participate, with the exception of the 126
colleges rated major football institutions, which must join Division IY2 Second,
each division will be able to write its own rules and will have only limited obligations to university-firms not in the same division. Third, and possibly most important, a number of large university-firms operating big-time programs have
threatened to leave the NCAA and construct an organization which would negotiate with national television networks for the sole benefit of these university-firms.
It is estimated that a television contract between a national television network and
the fifty most prestigious football teams might be worth twenty-five million
2s N.Y. Times, Jan. 1r, 1972, at 46, col. 4.

20 Some university-firms which operate big-time football programs were not in favor of the freshman
eligibility rule because they realized that it would be a rare freshman football player who could step
immediately into varsity football competition straight from high school. Such schools often "red shirt
student-athletes by withholding them from competition for a year in order to increase the studnt-athlctcs'
maturity and skills as well as to spread the student-athletes' academic work over a period of five years.
Hence, it is not common for a high school graduate to play varsity football as a freshman at the big-time
university-firms. This fact, argued such university-firms, placed them at a competitive disadvantage in
recruiting.
30 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1972, at 42, col. x.
a' Keith, They Were Unable to Reach Agreement on Divorce, SroRTs ILLuSTRATED, Jan. 22, 1973, at
57-58, provides an entertaining report of the politics internal to the NCAA at the January, 1973, Convention.
"1University-firms are free to select the division appropriate to their own purposes in all sports except
football, where the strength of the university-firm's schedule is the determining factor.

THrE NCAA

CARTEL

dollars 33 The current television contract which the NCAA has with the ABC network is for a lesser amount of money, primarily because ABC is forced to televise
many games that it would not show if allowed to make the choices. Should the
ABC television network be guaranteed, through a contract with a group of university-firms similar to the top fifty football schools mentioned above, that it could
televise the most interesting contests without regard to regional considerations and
NCAA politics,3 4 it would be willing to pay increased amounts of money for such
a contract because of the high viewer ratings that would result. Furthermore, the
university-firms involved would be more satisfied because they would not be forced
to split lucrative television revenues with the remainder of the NCAA membership.
The three-division structure represents a major step toward reducing the heterogeneity of university-firms which has plagued the NCAA. University-firms will
be able to select their own level of participation and, to paraphrase Darrell Royal,
Texas will no longer be bound by the actions and desires of Hofstra. The NCAA
anticipates that about 225 to 250 of its members will choose to enter Division I in
the three-division arrangement. Division I will consist of those university-firms
that are truly operating big-time programs and which approach intercollegiate athletics in a semi-professional or outright professional fashion.
One of the first rules that will probably be changed in Division I is the newly
voted NCAA limitation upon the number of athletic scholarships that can be granted
by any given university-firm. At its January, 1973, Convention, the NCAA voted to
limit the overall number of athletic scholarships that can be in effect at a single
university-firm to 29, with 75 scholarships being the limitation in football, and i3
scholarships being the limitation in basketball. Some university-firms currently
have as many as 150 scholarships in effect in football, and the 75 scholarship limitation was passed over their protests. At the same time, the Division I members
are likely to maintain scholarship limitations in the so-called minor tports, such
as fencing and golf, in order to reduce costs of competition. In general, one can
readily predict that those sports which generate spectator interest and revenues will
be the least likely to have meaningful numerical scholarship limitations.
V
PaNmicTED FuvuRt

BHA VIoR

The reorganization eliminated a major source of discontent within the NCAA.
Those university-firms which join Division I, however, will still face the perennial
problem of matching expenditures to revenues. The analysis of revenues and expenses of NCAA members carried out in i97o revealed that about two-thirds of all
university-firms lost money operating their intercollegiate athletic programs. During
" This estimate was provided by Dr. Milton Weisbecker, Director of Intercollegiate Athletics at
Illinois State University.
"'It is also likely that university-firms would begin to schedule contests on weekday evenings in
order to maximize both the television audience and the number of interesting contests that could be
televised.
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the 196i1-97i period, 42 schools dropped intercollegiate football from their programs2 5r The increase in expenditures for a university-firm supporting a big-time
intercollegiate athletic program was over ioo per cent during the decade of the
196o's, and the typical big-time intercollegiate athletic program cost almost $7oooo0
in the year 1969."6 A major attempt will be made by all divisions of the NCAA to

reduce intercollegiate athletic costs, with the third division attracting the most
budget-minded schools. But even Divisions I and II university-firms will strive in
whatever way possible to reduce costs and to increase revenues.
The major area where expenses might be reduced is in expenditures made in
order to recruit and maintain student-athletes. The NCAA currently has no rule
allowing one university-firm to sign a prospective student-athlete to a binding contract that prevents other NCAA members from negotiating with or utilizing him.
What does exist currently is a non-NCAA-sponsored "national letter of intent"
which, when signed by a prospective student-athlete, binds him to a given universityfirm while preventing other university-firms from using that student-athlete. 7 This
national letter of intent is subscribed to by all major athletic conferences and nearly
all important independent university-firms. A national letter of intent relating to
enrollment and competition for fall, 1973, could not be signed by a prospective
student-athlete until April 4, 1973. This date was almost five months after the end
of the high school football season. Hence, the competition for high school football
players is long and expensive. Division I of the NCAA is likely to create its own
national letter of intent for each sport and, in addition, designate a different signing date for each sport in order to reduce the time and expense incurred when the
recruiting season is overly long.
There has also been talk in the NCAA of establishing a draft system for high
school athletes similar to that carried out by admittedly professional leagues. Such
a system is likely first to be established on a conference basis. The University of
Michigan, for example, might obtain the right to negotiate with a given high school
prospect, and no other Big Ten university-firm could compete with the University
of Michigan for that individual's athletic services0 s A draft system would reduce
recruiting costs and could lead to a conference-wide or nation-wide agreement
concerning a reduction in the financial aid given student-athletes. The current freewheeling competition among university-firms allows a prospective student-athlete
to whipsaw one university-firm against another in order to obtain the most attractive terms.
The university-firms of the NCAA are often referred to as training grounds
'3

Ryan, A Grim Run to Fiscal Daylight,

so Id.
ITIf a

SpoRTs ILLUSTRATED,

Feb. 1, 1971, at 34.

prospective student-athlete enrolls in a university-firm other than the one for which he has
signed a national letter of intent, he loses two years of eligibility unless the first university-firm releases
him from his obligation. Once a student-athlete has attended one university-firm for at least one year,
however, he may transfer to another university-firm and will lose only one year of eligibility unless the
student-athlete is transferring from a junior college.
38 Conference letters of intent already exist and are a step in this direction.

TH NCAA

CARTEL

for admittedly professional athletics. The essence of this view is that the NCAA
university-firms bear the cost of training prospective professional athletes and receive
little in return from professional sports. This has led to the suggestion that the
NCAA university-firm should be allowed to sign their student-athletes to long-term
contracts for their services." Professional leagues or teams would then be compelled to purchase the contract of the student-athlete from the university-firms and
would, as a result, be forced to assume a major portion of the costs of training him.
This suggestion actually represents the imposition of a type of reserve clause in
intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA members can also attempt to increase revenues obtained from intercollegiate athletics by such ploys as renting their facilities and stadiums to professional teams40 and increasing the number of competitive contests that might be
scheduled by big-time university-firms. 4 1 The NCAA might well learn a lesson
from the National Basketball Association, which profitably deluges basketball fans
with a series of playoffs that do not terminate until the middle of May.
The NCAA must also in the near future come to terms with the Amateur
Athletic Union (AAU), an organization of amateur athletes at all levels. The
NCAA and the AAU have long clashed over issues such as who shall be primarily
responsible for the selection of Olympic athletes and who will control international
amateur competition, where many NCAA athletes ordinarily compete." The inability of the NCAA and the AAU to agree on such subjects has resulted in the
NCAA declaring ineligible athletes who participate in AAU-sanctioned international competition (for example, track contests with the Soviet Union's National
Team) and the AAU refusing to allow its minions to participate in NCAAsponsored activities. Several bills have been introduced in the United States Congress which have the intent of taking the eligibility question in international meets
out of the hands of the NCAA and the AAU. Both athletes and coaches would be
free to participate in international athletic contests without fear of reprisal. One
particular proposed piece of legislation, introduced by Representative Peter A.
Peyser of New York, would establish a Federal Scholastic and Amateur Sports Commission to oversee international athletic competition by Americans4
CONCLUSION

Despite its protestations, the NCAA does act as a cartel. The success of the
cartel has been limited by the market structure of intercollegiate athletics, but there
o Koch, supra note 3, at 26o.
It is obvious that football stadiums which seat 8o,ooo or more spectators are unused most of the

'o

year. Certain intercollegiate athletic conferences actually prohibit their members from renting their
facilities to professional teams. One may expect such rules to be eventually abolished.
"' The recent move by the NCAA to allow its members to schedule eleven football games rather than
ten is a first step in this direction.

'-See

A. iLATH, A HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATiLETC AssoCIA-

TION AND T" AM.LTEuR ATHLEnc UNION OF THE UNiTaD STATES, 1905-1963 (1964).
"'H.R. 5624, 93d Cong., sst Sess. (1973).
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are signs that the restructuring of the NCAA will increase the effectiveness of its
cartel. The stimulation for restructuring the NCAA has come from a host of
legal actions taken against the Association, by its own members and by the athletes
that it regulates, and from the threat of some members of the cartel to leave the
NCAA and to construct their own organization which would be responsive to their
needs and desires.

